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ESTATE OF B. J. SILLIMAN, Deceased, 
KENNETH SILLIMAN, Executor, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
· Case No. 
11,301 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the appellant un-
der and pursuant to the laws of eminent domain to 
acquire the property of respondent for public high-
way utilization. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Trial was held on the 28th and 29th day of 
March and the 5th day of April, 1968, before the 
Honorable Henry Ruggeri, I udge of the Seventh 
Judicial District in and for Emery County, State of 
Utah. Judgment of the court upon the general- ver-
2 
diet returned by the jury of eight was entered 
against the appellant and in favor of the respondent 
in the sum of $21.320. Appellant filed a Motion for 
New Trial in which the tria] judge ordered a remit-
titur of $2,536 or a new trial. The respondent ac-
cepted the remittitur and a new trial was denied by 
the trial court. The appellant thereupon prosecuted 
this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment 
and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent's property which constitutes the 
subject of the instant case is located west of the 
Green River city limits, in Emery County, Utah. The 
subject property affected consists of approximately 
633. 70 acres. The subject property is vacant land 
and unimproved, and is sparsely covered with 
greasewood on rolling, rought terrain, broken up 
with deep gullies and washes. At the time of acqui-
sition, there was a dumpyard located on the sub-
ject property. The subject property has access to 
U. S. Highway 50 and 6 and the Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad right of way. The high-
way crosses the right of way by way of an under-
pass which is located approximately 2 Y2 miles from 
the city of Green River. (Ex. P-1). The area acquired 
by the appellant consists of 212.15 acres. In addi-
tion to the area taken in fee, the appellant acquired 
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a. channel change easement in the amount of 7.1 
acres and identified as Pa.reel No. 3:E. The remain-
ing land consisted of 390.21 acres of which 130.48 
acres were located north of the proposed improve-
ment and 259.73 acres south of the proposed im-
provement. (Ex. P-1). The la.nd sought for public 
highway utilization is identified as Parcel Nos. 3:A, 
3:S, 6B, 6:A, 8:A, BB and 8G and is part of the con-
tinuation of the east-west interstate freeway I-70. The 
proposed improvement to be located on the subject 
property acquired is for an interchange with access 
limitations. The interchange provides for an on and 
off ramp to and from Green River, Utah. U. S. High-
way 50 and 6 north of the Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad easement will remain the same 
with no limitation on access. After the acquisition by 
the State, the subject property will have no access 
to the south portion of the remaining property from 
U. S. Highway 50 and 6. Access is acquired through 
a county road located southeast of the interchange. 
(Ex. P-7). 
Matters relating to the power of the appellant 
to condemn, public use and necessity of the high-
way project and the acquisition of respondent's 
properties therefor, and location of the facilities in a 
manner consonant with the greatest public good 
and least private in)llfy were admitted by respond-
ent, and the case was thereupon tried as to the is-
sues of evaluation of the property to be expropriat-
ed, and damages, if any, by reason of severance, 
less benefit accruinq, if any, by reason of construc-
tion of the highway. The date of taking was July 9, 
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1966. The respondent's witnesses were Kenneth N. 
Silliman, J. W. Hammond, Carl J. Leavitt. The State 
called two expert witnesses, Memory Cain and Al-
den S. Adams. The specific evaluation estimates of 
the witnesses were, respectively, as follows: 
a. Silliman 
1. Land taken ------------------------------- ___ $53,169.20 
2. Severance damage to remaining 
property ----------------------------· ___________ $12,487.50 
3. Total opinion ______________________________ $65,656.70 
b. Hammond 
1. Land taken _______ -------·----- ______________ $41,747.20 
2. Severance damage to remaining 
property __ . ------·-------·-·----· ·····---···-$12,487.50 
3. Total opinion ______ -------··-·--·-----·--__ $54,234.70 
c. Leavitt 
1. Land taken _______ --···---·--· --·-----·---- $41,747.20 
2. Severance damage to remaining 
property --·· ·-·--------------------------·----- $12,487.50 
3. Total opinion _____________________________ $54,234.70 
d. Cain 
1. Land taken ----·--·--· ______________________ $ 6,296.50 
2. Severance damage to remaining 
property __ ··--- .... ___ ---·-··-·-------____ NONE 
3. Total opinion ---------------·------- _______ $ 6,296.50 
e. Adams 
1. Land taken ------·- ---------·---------- _____ $ 4,277.80 
2. Severance damage to remaining 
property ______ ·----------····------------·--__ $ 1,685.00 
3. Total opinion -----·---------------·--------- $5,962.80 
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The jury returned its general verdict in the fol-
lowing amount: 
a. Market value of property taken by 
the State -------------- ----------------------------- $ 6,296.50 
b. Damages, if any, by reason of sev-
erance ___________________ ---------------------------- $15,023.50 
c. Less benefit accruing, if any, by 
reason of construction of the highway NONE 
d. Add net severance __________________________ $15,023.50 
e. Total judgment _______________________________ $21,320.00 
On motion of appellant for a new trial, the trial 
court found that the total amount awarded for sev-
erance damages was not justified by the evidence 
and was excessive and reduced the amount to $12,-
487.50. From the judgment entered, the appellant 
prosecuted this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing 
to grant a new trial. The refusal was conditioned on 
respondent's accepting a remittitur in an amount 
equal to the highest estimate of severance damages 
testified to by any witness. The trial court in deny-
ing the new trial found that the verdict for_ sever-
6 
ance damages was excessive and not justified by 
the evidence. 
A study of the record indicates that the jury 
award for severance damages was unusually large: 
(1) The amount of $15,028.50 for severance dam-
ages was $2,536.00 over the highest testimony of 
any expert witness; (2) The value of the land taken 
as found by the jury was considerably less than 
would support their finding as to the diminution in 
value of the remaining land; (3) A large portion of 
the severance figure in the amount of $8,280.00 was 
based on one element, i.e., complete loss of access 
(Tr. 35, 67) in which the appellant proved was not 
a fact, in that access was available to the remaining 
land (Tr. 188. 195) (Ex. P-7) and a portion of the re-
maining land was landlocked prior to the acquisi-
tion by the state (Tr. 52-53). A review of the record 
shows that the jury either misunderstood the facts 
or was influenced with passion and prejudice. 
The Utah Supreme Court has reversed a trial 
court on facts similar to the instant case. In Porcu-
pine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 
2d 318, 392 P.2d 620 (1964), the trial court denied de-
fendant's motion for a new trial on the condition that 
plaintiff accept additurs to the jury's award of sev-
erance damages. This court stated on p. 320: 
Granting or denying a new trial is largely in the 
discretion of the trial court. Here the trial court 
clearly indicated that in his opinion the jury verdict 
was less than the smalJest amount which the jury 
could reasonably award under the evidence by 
granting an additur to two defendants. A careful 
study of the record before us, (some parts of the 
evidence is not before us) indicates that the jury 
verdicts were unusually small, suggesting passion 
or prejudice or a misunderstanding of the law or 
facts presented. Under these circumstances we con-
clude th'lt the interest of justice requires that this 
proceeding be remanded for a new trial as to all 
defendants. 
It is true that in Weber Basin Water Conserv-
ancy District v. Braegger, 8 Utah 2d 346, 334 P.2d 
758 (1959), this court reduced a judgment by jury 
when the remittitur represented a figure derived 
and identified from the record. On the contrary, in 
the instant case, there is nothing in the records to 
indicate what the excess over the amount of the 
highest testimony on severance damages repre-
sented. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE 
,JURY TO CONSIDER THE IMPROPER ARGUMENT 
OF RESPONDENT'S CLOSING STATEMENT IN EX-
PRESSING AN INCORRECT MEASURE OF DAMAGES. 
During the course of the trial, respondent's 
witness, Mr. J. W. Hammond, testified to the market 
data approach along with the income approach in 
determining the market value of the subject prop-
erty (Tr. 68). Over appeJlant's objections, respond-
ent's attorney, in his closing statement, was per-
mitted to argue to the jury that the amount of the in-
come approach should be added to the value al-
ready determined by the market data approach 
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(Tr. 234). Mr. Hammond testified as follows: 
Q. So then if we were to assume that there was a 
portion of ground that had an income of $30 per 
month and that $30 was, that the property had an 
income of $30 per month, then would this fact in-
crease the appraised value that you would place 
on that property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. By how much? 
A. Of course, depending on where it was, if it were 
in the blue, I have already appraised it for more 
than that (Tr. 68). 
On cross examination, Mr. Hammond explained 
further the income approach: 
Q. All right. So that is $3,000 for the total opera-
tion; right? 
A. $3,000 for the, for whatever acreage was in-
volved, yes. (Tr. 76). 
And further: 
Q. The more acrease you had in it, the less per 
acre? 
A. The less per acre it would be, yes sir. 
Q. Right. So as far as you know, it could be $10 
per acre? 
A. As far as I know, it could be, if that was the 
area involved. (Tr. 77). 
This court has recently stated that appraisers 
commonly use three approaches to values. State v. 
Bingham Gas & Oil Company, _____ .Utah 2d .. _______ , 440 
P.2d 260 (1968). In The Appraisal of Real Estate, The 
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American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 63-64, 
(4th ed. 1964), it is stated: 
In the majority of his assignments, the appraiser 
utilized all three approaches. On occasion, he may 
believe the value indication from one approach will 
be more significant than from the other two, yet 
he will use all three as a check against each and to 
test his own judgment. 
But in no case does the appraiser add all the 
amounts derived from the three approaches togeth-
er as the attorney attempted to do in his argument 
to the jury and in which the jury, because the trial 
court so allowed, was free to so consider. The law 
is well stated in 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain, § 286 (3) 
(1965): 
Subject to such reasonable limitations as may be 
imposed by the trial court, counsel for litigants in 
a jury trial of a condemnation proceeding have the 
right to argue the issues raised by the evidence and 
the pleadings; but a duty rests on the trial judge 
to supervise the scope of such argument and to 
limit it to the evidence and to the argument of 
opposing counsel, and on argument which. is not 
based on the evidence, or states an incorrect meas-
ure of damages, or is contrary to the instructions 
on the question, is improper. 
In Adair v. N. W. Electric Power Cooperative. Inc., 
(Mo. App. 1959) 329 S.W.2d 33, the court held that 
argument of counsel in prescribing a measure of 
damages other than the difference between the 
value before and after the taking was prejudicial 
error. In his argument counsel for the property own-
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er asked the jury to consider one dollar a day for 30 
years for the easement sought by the condemning 
party. The court stated on p. 38: 
The ultimate objective is to hold trials that are fair. 
The proper and legal rule for measuring damages in 
this type of case has been judicially declared many 
times. The trial court instructed the jury accord-
ingly. The evidence was confined within such limi-
tations. Then this argument broke through and 
over and outside of legal and proper barriers and 
adversary objections were denied and overruled. 
The argument as made was not based upon any 
evidence. It suggested an illegal, improper and in-
correct measure of damages and was definitely con-
trary to the court's instructions. We believe and 
hold it was improper, unjustified and when con-
sidered in the light of the court's refusal to sustain 
the objections thereto, amounted to prejudicial and 
reversible error. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE: 
A. THE OPINION OF RESPONDENT'S WITNESS, MR. 
KENNETH SILLIMAN. ON THE GROUNDS THAT HIS 
VALUE OF THE LAND TAKEN AND SEVERANCE 
DAMAGES WAS MORE THAN THE TOTAL BEFORE 
VALUE. 
B. THE OPINION OF RESPONDENT'S WITNESS, MR. 
CARL J. LEAVITT, ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE DID 
NOT VALUE THE PROPERTY AT ITS FAIR MARKET 
VALUE NOR AS OF THE DATE OF TAKING. 
C. THE OPINION OF RESPONDENT'S WITNESS, MR. 
J. W. HAMMOND, ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE REC-
OGNIZED SPECIAL BENEFITS BUT DID NOT DE-
DUCT SAME FROM HIS SEVERANCE DAMAGES. 
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Respondent's witnesses were familiar with land 
values and were allowed to so testify. Although the 
limited experience of a witness goes to the weight 
of his testimony, Provo River Water Users' Ass'n. v. 
Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P.2d 777 (1943), it is appel-
lant's cont8ntion that an expert's opinion based on 
an improper approach can not be of benefit to a 
jury and should not be considered by them in de-
termining the amount of damages. 
Generally, the law is stated in 5 Nichols, Emi-
nent Domain, § 18.42(1), (3rd ed. 1962), at 248-9, as 
follows: 
While consideration of certain speculative possi-
bilities is not fatal (citing case) an opinion based 
on purely speculative use (citing cases) or on an 
erroneous standard of value (citing cases) Will be 
rejected. The same rule of exclusion applies also 
to legally non-cognizable elements of damage. This 
is an implicit exception to the willing seller--willing 
buyer concept of market value. Though it is true 
that such participants in a voluntary sale may give 
consideration to elements which unquestionably 
have a depreciating effect upon value, if an element 
is damnum absque injurea no consideration may be 
given thereto. As one court said: (citing case) 
"Opinions of witnesses based upon supposed ele-
ments of damage which were not recognized by law 
as proper to be considered in condemnation pro-
ceedings should have been excluded. Only such 
opinions as are based on evidence of lawful ele- · 
men ts of damages can be of benefit to a jury in the 
assessment of the amount of damage." 
With the above announced rule in mind, appel-
lant made objections to the testimony of respond-
12 
ent's three value witnesses. The objections will be 
taken up separately as follows: 
A. On cross examination, Mr. Kenneth Silli-
man, respondent's first value witness was asked for 
a before value. 
Q. I want to know if you have an opinion as to 
the total amount; yes. 
A. I did, prior to the taking by the state, yes. 
Q. And what was that opinion? 
A. I-approximately $50,000. (Tr. 42). 
The above testimony took place on the first day of 
trial and without the benefit of compiling 15 sepa-
rate items of value to which Mr. Silliman testified 
to. It is noted that a tota 1 before and after value was 
never testified. to on direct examination by Mr. Silli-
man. Without calculating the areas and their values 
themselves, the jury or the court were not aware 
of Mr. Silliman' s values for the land taken and sev-
erance damages. 
This court has stated that the measure of com-
pensation when part of a tract is taken is the differ-
ence between the fair market value of the whole 
tract before the taking and the fair market value of 
what remains after the taking. Salt Lake Coun.ty Cot-
tonwood Sanitary District v. Toone, 11 Utah 2d 232, 
357 P.2d 486 (1960); State v. Ward. 112 Utah 452, 189 
P.2d 113 (1.948); State v. Cooperative Security Cor-
poration, 122 Utah 134, 247 P.2d 269 (1952). It has to 
be conceded that the sum of all its parts can not ex-
13 
ceed the whole. The opinion of Mr. Silliman led the 
jury to believe that although the entire subject prop-
erty was valued at $50,000 immediately prior to the 
take, the value of part of the tract and severance 
damages would be $65,656.70. From his testimony, 
it is evident that his opinion contained legally non-
cognizable elements of damage. Assuming that there 
was 100 % damage to the remaining land, the most 
the jury should have been allowed to consider in 
their deliberation was $50,000. 
B. Respondent's expert witness, l\.1r. Carl J. 
Leavitt, did not value the subject property as of the 
date of taking and did not appraise the subject 
property at its fair market value. It is well settled in 
this state that the measure of damages is just com·-
pensation and just compensation is the market value 
of the property taken. Southern Pacific Company v. 
Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d 693 (1960). Market 
value is defined as the amount of money which a 
purchaser willing, but not obliged to buy the prop-
erty, would pay to an owner, willing but not obliged 
to sell it. Southern Pacific Company v. Arthur, 10 
Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d 693 (1960); State v. Noble, 6 ··. 
Utah 2d 40, 305 P.2d 495 (1957), Mr. Leavitt was asked · 
to define fair market value: 
A. Well, fair market value. The market is so un- . 
stable now, who knows what the fair market value 
is. Let me put it that way to you. 
Q. Is that your answer? 
A. That is my answer. (Tr. 101). 
14 
The basis of his opinion was brought out as follows: 
Q. And what you are saying then as to these 
values you placed on the subject property is what a 
willing buyer who purchased the property-
A. If there were a willing buyer and a willing seller 
why you would have a, you would have a good 
transaction. I have an opinion on the property of 
my own that whether it is of any value to you or 
not but-and to my way of thinking on placing a 
valuation on it people that hoJd prop~rty for 25 to 
30 years certainly have some idea of some time ex-
pecting a value out of it. And if it is indicative that 
there is coming one they don't like to be forced. 
(Tr. 97). 
* * * 
Q. But when you say they have been forced to 
give up their property, what you are telling us then 
is the state ought to pay more for the property 
than it would, than a willing buyer would pay? 
A. When I say forced, I mean it from this stand-
point, that who is to say that it might not be worth 
ten times that ten years from now. 
Q. Well, I think that is why you are on the stand, 
Mr. Hammond, or Mr. Leavitt. 
A. The point I am getting at is being forced at a 
point now rather than a later date when it might be 
more valuable. (Tr. 98). 
It is obvious that Mr. Leavitt did not use a willing 
buyer-willing seller concept in his appraisal of the 
subject property, nor did he appraise the subject 
property at the date of the taking by the appellant. 
It is clear in Mr. Leavitt's testimony that he valued 
the subject property with an element of future spec-
ulative value. By statute it is provided in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-34-11 (1953): 
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For the purpose of assessing compensation and 
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to have 
accrued at the date of the service of summons, and 
its actual value at that date shall be the measure 
of compensation for all property to be actuallv 
taken, and the basis of damages to property not 
actually taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases 
where such damages are allowed, as provided in the 
next preceding section .... 
By Mr. Leavitt's own admission, he did not assess 
compensation at the date of taking: 
Q. You have arrived at a conclusion as to the 
value of the land-
A. We looked at the map and we arrived at that 
conclusion that Mr. Hammond gave you. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did you relate that value at that time to 
any date when the property was acquired by the 
state? 
A. Well, probably not. I didn't. I don't look at it 
from that standpoint. It is what it is worth now, 
not yesterday. (Tr. 99). 
It is conceded that an expert can take into account 
potential development in the area, Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy District v. Ward. 10 Utah 2d 29, 
347 P.2d 862 (1959), but nowhere does any jurisdic-
tion allow just compensation to be assessed on the . 
theory expressed by Mr. Leavitt. 
C. Besides the issues of value of land taken 
and severance damages to the remaining land, the 
issue of benefits was tried. The state's expert wit-
ness, Mr. Memory Cain, testified that any severance 
damages to the remaining tract was offset by the 
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benefit derived from the highway improvement. 
(Tr. 122). Before the acquisition, the property which 
received the benefit was grazing land. (Tr. 119-120). 
After the acquisition, the highest and best use of the 
same property became commercial. (Tr. 122). 
By statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (1953) 
benefits may be set off from damages to the remain-
ing land. In Salt Lake & U.R. Co. v. Butterfield, 46 
Utah 431, 150 Pac. 931 (1915) the court restricted the 
application of the statute by limiting the type of 
benefits which could be deducted. The benefit in 
the instant case was not one which merely in-
creased the traffic flow but enhanced the market 
value immediately by improving its adaptability for 
a higher and better use. Petkus v. State Highway 
Commission, 24 Wis.2d 643, 130 N.W.2d 253 (1964). 
Respondent's expert witness, Mr. J. W. Ham-
mond, admitted that there was a benefit to the re-
maining land but did not offset the benefits from the 
severance damage. (Tr. 88-9). 
POINT IV 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS 
ASSIGNED IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT'S 
CASE AND REQUIRES A REVERSAL OF THE JUDG-
MENT. 
Assuming that standing alone each of the errors 
assigned were harmless, the cumulative effect of 
the errors substantially prejudiced the interest of 
appellant and materially caused the rendition of an 
erroneous judgment. It has been held that errors 
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occurring in a trial when considered together dis-
close that the party did not have a fair trial, a re-
versal of the judgment is proper. State v. Bloomfield 
Tractor Sales, Inc., (Mo. App. 1964), 381 S.W.2d 20; 
State v. Parkey, (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) 295 S.V;- 2d 
457. In the latter case the court stated at p. 462: 
There may be some doubt as to whether each of the 
four errors above discussed was of such prejudicia~ 
effect in and of itself as to constitute reversible 
error. But we are constrained to hold that the 
cumulative effect of such errors was undoubtedly 
such as to require a reversal of the judgment ap-
pealed from. 
CONCLUSION 
A discussion of the points in this brief and a re-
view of the record clearly indicates that the errors 
assigned, taken together or alone, require a reversal 
of the judgment. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion 
for a new trial and that respondent's argument to 
the jury that income from the property could be con-
sidered by them as a separate item of damage was 
prejudicial error. Appellant urges that the measure 
of damages is a matter not to be argued to the jury, 
but that the trial court should limit the measure of 
damages according to the law. The same rule should 
have been applied to the witnesses testifying to 
value. Once a witness has shown that he is familiar 
with the land value in the area of the acquisition, 
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the fact that he has limited qualifications or experi-
ence goes to the weight rather than to its admissibil-
ity. In this regard, appellant makes no issue. But 
when expressing his opinion, the witness must fol-
low and apply legal standards and acceptable basic 
principales of real property evaluation. If the wit-
ness in arriving at his value conclusions, has incor-
rectly used a wrong approach to value, or included 
non-compensable elements of damages, or penal-
ized the condemning agency for forcing the acqui-
sition, or created a windfall in favor of the property 
owner, the opinion should not be considered by the 
jury at all in assessing compensation. 
In view of the testimony of the witnesses and 
the rulings of the tria] court, it is unlikely that the 
jury, in their deliberation and in arriving at an ex-
cess verdict, had before them a correct measure of 
damages to guide them. 
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